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FAMILY LAW - ADOPTION: DO LAWS PROHIBITING 
REIMBURSEMENT TO A NATURAL MOTHER FOR 
REASONABLE EXPENSES INCURRED DURING 
PREGNANCY TRULY SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD? In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 
468 (1991). 
According to a recent Time Magazine article on infertility, more 
than one couple in twelve in this country have difficulty conceiving· 
a child" Once a couple reaches the "thirtysomething years," that 
number increases to one out of every seven couples.2 In fact, "[t]he 
number of doctor visits for fertility problems nearly tripled between 
1968 and 1984."3 For this and a variety of other reasons more and 
more couples are turning to adoption as an alternative. 
In 1975, the Federal Government stopped recording the number 
of babies adopted each year. 4 An independent estimate in 1986, from 
the National Committee for Adoption in Washington, set the total 
for that year at approximately 60,000 adoptions by non-relatives.5 
From the early 1980s it seems that independent adoptions6 are also 
on the rise. 7 As the number of private adoptions escalates, many 
professionals are concerned that the standards and safeguards, in-
tended first and foremost to protect the children, are slipping.8 
In re Adoption No. 99799 and this casenote address one of the 
many adoption issues our courts face today: Which expenses incurred 
by a natural mother during her pregnancy are reimbursable by 
adoptive parents?1O This is an important question because Maryland 
law prohibits the payment of compensation to a natural parent in 
exchange for that parent's consent to an adoption. II Reimbursement 
L Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 56. 
2.Id. 
3. Id. at 58. 
4. Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 86, 86. 
5.Id. 
6. Eileen Ogintz, "Baby Wanted: Call Viv ... ": How More Couples are Adver-
tising for a Child, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1988, at 160, 162 ("Most states recognize 
three legal paths to adoption: through public agencies, usually part of local or 
state government; through private agencies; and through private placement 
(independent) arrangements."). See generally infra note 14. 
7. Ogintz, supra note 6, at 162. In 1982. according to the National Committee 
for Adoption, there were 16,743 independent adoptions and 14,549 private 
agency adoptions. This was the first time since 1961 that independent adoptions 
outpaced private agency adoptions. Id. 
8. See Gibbs, supra note 4, at 88. 
9. 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991). 
10. See id. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. 
ll. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
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for certain expenses could, therefore, result in crimina1 prosecution 
and conviction of a misdemeanor .12 The expense in question in In re 
Adoption No. 9979 was a reimbursement for maternity clothing. 13 
In re Adoption No. 9979 concerned a petition for the adoption 
of an infant child filed in Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 
Maryland. 14 A court investigator conducted an adoption investigation 
and recommended that the petition be granted. IS The investigator 
also requested, however, that the adoptive parents submit itemized 
bills of all payments made to or on behalf of the natural mother .16 
The adoptive parents filed a statement of expenses paid to the natural 
mother which included a $488.00 reimbursement for maternity cloth-
ing'" 
At the close of the adoption hearing on October 25, 1989, the 
trial judge signed the final decree approving the adoption. IS Subse-
12. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991). Section 5-327 of the Family 
Law Code provides the following: 
(a) In general. - (1) An agency, institution, or individual who 
renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual 
for adoption may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either 
the natural parent of the individual to be adopted, or from or on 
behalf of the individual who is adopting the individual, any compen-
sation for the placement. 
(2) This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any inter-
ested person, of reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital 
or medical or legal services. 
(c) Prosecution by State's Attorney. - The State's Attorney shall 
prosecute any violation of this section. 
(d) Penalty. - A person who violates this section is guilty of a . 
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding 
$100 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months, or both, for each 
offense. 
Id. See generally infra note 47. 
13. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. As requested by the court 
investigator, the natural mother provided the trial court with an itemized list 
of the clothing purchased. Id. For the itemized list of the maternity clothing, 
see id. at 41 n.l, 591 A.2d at 469 n.l. 
14. Id. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. This was a direct adoption, not involving any 




17. Id. at 40-41, 591 A.2d at 469. Among the other expenses were attorney's fees, 
court costs and $378.35 paid to the natural mother as reimbursement for 
hospitalization insurance. The compensation for these expenses went unchal-
lenged by the State .. Appellants' attorney submitted an affidavit from the 
natural mother that she had not kept any of the bills for the maternity clothing; 
she did, however, itemize the expenses for the court. Id. 
18. Id. at 54, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
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quently, on December 14, 1989, the judge entered an order finding 
that the reimbursement for the maternity clothing was not a permitted 
expense and was therefore disallowed. 19 The adopting parents ap-
pealed the trial judge's order to the court of special appeals and, 
prior to consideration of the case by the lower appellate court, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari. 20 The 
primary issue for consideration by the court of appeals was whether 
section 5-327 of the Maryland Family Law Code prohibits adoptive 
parents from reimbursing a natural mother for maternity clothing 
expenses.21 
Adopting a child is a relatively new legal concept in America. 22 
The first state adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 
185}.23 The first Maryland adoption statute was contained in chapter 
244 of the Acts of 1892.24 In Maryland, "[a]doption did not exist at 
common law but is governed by statutes [currently] codified in 
sections 5-301 through 5-330 of the Family Law Article. "25 The term 
"adoption" itself was only recently defined by the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland as "the means by which the legal relationship 
of parent and child is created between those not related as such by 
nature. "26 
In 1947, the Maryland General Assembly, acting upon the re-
commendations of a commission appomted in 1945 to study Maryland 
adoption laws,27 revised then existing law with the enactment of 
chapter 599, Laws of 1947.28 One of the most noteworthy changes 
19. Id. at 55, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
20. Id. at 41-42, 591 A.2d at 469. 
21. Id. at 42, 591 A.2d at 469. 
22. Susan K. LeMay, Note, The Emergence oj Wrongful Adoption As A Cause 
oj Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 475 (1988-89) ("The status of a parent-child 
relationship created by adoption is a relatively new concept in American law; 
the first adoption statute was not enacted until 1851."). 
23. Id. at 475 n.l; Yasuhide Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. 
L. 677, 677 (1981-82). 
24. L.F.M. v. Department of Social Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 391, 507 A.2d 1151, 
1157 (1986). Chapter 244 of the Acts of 1892 is currently codified at MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-301 to -330 (1991). In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 
463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988). 
25. Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 110, 591 
A.2d 501, 503 (1991) (citations omitted); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 
5-301 to -330 (1991). 
26. L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 391, 507 A.2d at 1157. 
27. Id.; see John S. Strahorn, Jr., Changes Made by the New Adoption Law, 10 
MD. L. REv. 20, 21 (1949). 
28. L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 391-92, 507 A.2d at 1157. The statute enacted as 
chapter 599 of the Laws of 1947 was virtually identical to the one proposed 
by the commission. Id. (citing Report oj the Commission to Study Revision 
oj Adoption Laws oj the State oj Maryland, BALTIMORE DAILY REc., June 1, 
1946). 
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in this new law was the inclusion of a legislative policy acknowledging 
the need for protection of the parties to an adoption (Le., the child, 
the natural parents, and the adopting parents).29 With certain minor 
changes, this statement of legislative intent remains intact today.30 
The courts in Maryland have focused upon the preservation of 
the welfare and interests of the adopted child as the most important 
of the purposes espoused in section 5-303(b)(1).31 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held in Courtney v. RichmomP2 that "[t]he 
law governing adoptions seeks to protect the child, the natural parents 
and the adopting parent or parents[.] [T]he rights of the parents, 
both natural and adoptive, are not absolute, however, but are subject 
to the best interests of the child. "33 The court further asserted that, 
although the rights of the natural and adoptive parents should be 
carefully guarded, the best interests of the child are the primary 
considerations in every adoption.34 
An adoption proceeding is therefore concerned with the limited 
matter of the status of the child to be adopted. 35 Once the trial court 
decides that it is in the best interests of the child to approve the 
adoption petition, and the adoption decree is signed, the responsibility 
and jurisdiction of the court ends.36 Spencer v. Franks37 supports this 
29. See L.F.M., 67 Md. App. at 392, 507 A.2d at 1157. Chapter 599 of the Laws 
of 1947 began with the following statement of legislative policy: 
The General Assembly declares its conviction that the policies 
and procedures for adoption are socially necessary and desirable, 
, having as their purpose the three-fold protection of (I) the adoptive 
child, from unnecessary separation from his natural parents and from 
adoption by persons unfit to have such responsibility; (2) the natural 
parents, from hurried and abrupt decisions to give up the child; and 
(3) the adopting parents, by providing them information about the 
child and his background, and protecting them from subsequent 
disturbance of their relationships with the child by natural parents. 
[d. (quoting Laws of 1947, ch. 599). 
30. [d.; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(1)-(3) (1991). 
31. Lynn M., 312 Md. at 463, 540 A.2d at 800 ("The predominant theme of all 
these enactments has been to preserve and protect the interests and welfare of 
the child."); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303(b)(I) (1991). Section 5-
303(b)(I) states that the purpose of the statute is to protect "children from: 
(i) unnecessary separation from their natural parents; and (ii) adoption by 
individuals who are unfit for the responsibility . . . ." [d. 
32. 55 Md. App. 382, 462 A.2d 1223 (1983). 
33. [d. at 392, 462 A.2d at 1229 (citation omitted); see also supra note 31. 
34. Courtney, 55 Md. App. at 392, 462 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Coffey v. Department 
of Social Servs., 41 Md. App. 340, 358, 397 A.2d 233, 243 (1973) (quoting 
Winter v. Director of the Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 395-96, 143 
A.2d 81, 84, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 (1958))). 
35. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 58, 591 A.2d at 477 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
36. [d. at 59, 591 A.2d at 478 (Eldridge, J., concurring); Falck v. Chadwick, 190 
Md. 461, 467, 59 A.2d 187, 189 (1948) ("The Court is not invested with 
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position. In Spencer, the trial court made provisions for custody and 
visitafion rights after granting a petition for adoption. 38 The court 
of appeals reversed the visitation and custody orders because they 
were not within the trial court's jurisdiction once the adoption 
petition was decided.39 
One of the primary problems dealt with during such an adoption 
proceeding and affecting the interests of children is that of compen-
sation paid by the adoptive parents to the natural parent(s). Certain 
Maryland statutes govern the forms of appropriate and inappropriate 
compensation related to an adoption.4O The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, in Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Administra-
tion,41 considered these statutes: Article 27, section 35C, of Mary-
land's Annotated Code and section 5-327 of the Maryland Family 
Law Code.42 The Stambaugh court held that there exists a "strong 
policy in [Maryland] forbidding payments of compensation to a 
natural parent in exchange for that parent's consent to an adop-
tion. "43 
Article 27, section 35C, of Maryland's Annotated Code provides 
that "[aJ person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell, 
barter, or trade a child for money or property . . . or anything else 
of value."44 Additionally, section 5-327 of the Maryland Family Law 
Code, entitled "Prohibited Compensation,"4s makes the payment of 
compensation, for or in connection with the placement of an indi-
vidual for adoption, a criminal misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
not to exceed $100 or imprisonment of up to three months, or both. 46 
Section 5-327(a)(I) provides as follows: 
An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service 
in connection with the placement of an -individual for adop-
continuous authority . . . to entertain petitions filed from time to time ... 
for modification of the decree on proof of altered circumstances of either the 
natural or adoptive parents."). 
37. 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306 (1937). 
38. [d. at 77-79, 195 A. at 308-09. 
39. [d. at 82-83, 195 A. at 310. 
40. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991) (prohibiting certain compen-
sation in adoption proceedings); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 & Supp. 
1990) (prohibiting "child selling"). 
41. 323 Md. 106, 591 A.2d 501 (1991). The Stambaugh court sought to determine 
whether a natural mother could waive liability on the part of a natural father, 
for past or future child support, pursuant to a divorce decree, in exchange for 
the father's consent to adoption of the children by the mother's second husband. 
[d. at 108, 591 A.2d at 502. . 
42. [d. at 112, 591 A.2d at 504. 
43. [d. 
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (1987 & Supp. 1990). 
45. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (1991). 
46. [d. § 5-327(a)(I), (d). 
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tion may not charge or receive from or on behalf of either 
the natural parent of the individual to be adopted, or from 
or on behalf of the individual who is adopting the individual, 
any compensation for the placement. 47 
Section 5-327(a)(2) provides a narrowly limited exception to the 
general rule: "This subsection does not prohibit the payment, by any 
interested person, of reasonable and customary charges or fees for 
hospital or medical or legal services."48 The medical expenses excep-
tion is permitted because it is deemed to directly benefit the child's 
best interests, consistent with the underlying policy of Maryland's 
adoption laws.49 Section 5-327 was the governing law for In re 
Adoption No. 9979. 
Two primary issues faced the court in construing this section 
and its application to the facts of the case. The first was whether 
the language "individual who renders any service in connection with 
the placement of an individual for adoption" governs the natural 
mother as a person rendering a service to the adoptive parents.50 The 
second was whether a reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses 
falls within the section's exception for medical expenses.51 
Commentators suggest that section 5-327 is not intended to 
govern payments made directly to the natural mother by the adoptive 
parents but only to third party intermediaries. 52 The language of 
section 5-327 supports this argument. Section 5-327 governs payments 
made on behalf of the natural parent of the individual to be adopted 
to agencies, institutions or individuals who render services in con-
nection with the placement.53 The section says nothing about pay-
ments made directly to the natural parent. If literally construed, 
however, the natural parent could be considered an "individual who 
47. [d. § 5-327(a)(I). Section 5-327 of the Family Law Article has been amended 
to include a provision requiring accounting reports in independent adoptions. 
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(c) (Supp. 1992). For purposes of this 
Note, the amendment has no consequence, and reference to section 5-327 is to 
the version in force at the time No. 9979 was decided. 
48. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(2) (1991). 
49. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 49, 591 A.2d at 473. The court of appeals recognized 
that "a lack of clothing could have an adverse effect upon the health and 
welfare of the natural mother," and upon the unborn child as well, but noted 
that "the same could be said for the lack of food or shelter, and reimbursement 
for those expenses would not constitute payment of customary medical ex-
penses." [d. 
50. See id. at 42-45, 591 A.2d at 469-71. 
51. See id. at 42-43, 49-50, 591 A.2d at 470, 473. 
52. [d. at 61-62, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see Carol L. Nicolette 
& Libby C. Reamer, Comment, Regulatory Options for Surrogate Arrangements 
in Maryland, 18 U. HALT. L. REV. llO, 120 (1988). 
53. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(I) (1991). 
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renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual 
for adoption .... "54 
The Maryland Senate addressed this very issue in 1989, when 
Senate Bill 58 was introduced. 55 The original purpose of Senate Bill 
58 was to broaden section 5-327's language to include within its 
prohibition payments made to natural parents. 56 Senate Bill 58 ulti-
mately was not enacted as a revision of section 5-327, but as an 
entirely separate law, Article 27, section 35CY 
Like Maryland, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in 
this country also prohibits the payment of monetary or other com-
pensation to a child's natural parents in an effort to attain their 
consent to an adoption, or the termination of their parental rights. 58 
In fact, almost all jurisdictions have enacted statutes prohibiting 
certain forms of compensation for the natural parents' consent to 
an adoption with expressly limited exceptions for certain medical and 
legal expenses.59 
One such example is illustrated by the decision of the Court of 
Appeals of Texas in the case of Kingsley v. State.60 , The facts of 
Kingsley are substantially similar to In re Adoption No. 9979. The 
defendant in Kingsley was an attorney who had reimbursed a natural 
mother for a variety of expenses she incurred during pregnancy, 
including maternity clothing.61 Kingsley concerned -the application of 
the Texas Penal Code Annotated, section 25.06, prohibiting the 
payment of compensation to acquire or maintain the possession of 
54. See id. 
55. See S.B. No. 58, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess. 
56. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 62, 591 A.2d at 479-80 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
57. Id. at 62-63, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring); see MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 35C (Supp. 1992). 
58. See In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485 (III. App. Ct. 1989) (consent 
for adoption given for illegal payment of money is void as against public 
policy); People v. Daniel, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal. App. 1987) (father's conviction 
for attempting to sell his daughter to family for $90,000 upheld under criminal 
statute prohibiting sale or attempted sale of a person); State v. Roberts, 471 
So. 2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (payment of $3,000 in exchange for consent 
to adoption of a baby is illegal); People v. Michelman, 403 N.Y.S.2d 417 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (New York Social Welfare Law § 371(12) deemed to 
prohibit "arrangements" made for unauthorized placement of child, and 
particularly the business that arises from such placement). 
59. See Nicolette & Reamer, supra note 52, at 119-20. As of 1981 at least 41 states 
had enacted legislation prohibiting the payment of compensation beyond ex-
penses connected with the adoption itself. Id. at 119 n.71; see Claire Berman, 
Laws on Private Adoptions, PARENTS MAGAZINE, Feb. 1983, at 67, 71 ("For 
example, in California no payment may be made in connection with an adoption 
beyond the medical and living expenses of the mother through the pregnancy."). 
60. 744 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
61. Id. at 192. 
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a child for the purpose of adoption.62 The Texas statute provides 
exceptions, similar to Maryland's section 5-327, including reimburse-
ment for medical expenses.63 The court held that payments for 
maternity clothes are not legal or medical expenses.64 Although King-
sley appears to be the only case, outside of Maryland, that specifically 
deals with the question of maternity clothing expenses, other juris-
dictions have adjudicated the validity of similar expenses.65 
In a five-to-two decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses incurred by 
the natural mother is prohibited by s,ection 5-327.66 The court also 
held that the due process rights of the natural mother were violated 
by the entry of this order without notice to her or an opportunity 
62. Id. at 192-93. 
63. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.06 (Vernon 1986). Section 25.06 provides as 
follows: 
Id. 
Sale or Purchase of Child 
(a) A person commit~ an offense if he: 
(1) possesses a child or has the custody, conservatorship, or 
guardianship of a child whether or not he has actual possession of 
the child, and he offers to accept, agrees to accept, or accepts a thing 
of value for the delivery of the child to another or for the possession 
of the child by another for the purposes of adoption; or 
(2) offers to give, agrees to give, or gives a thing of value to 
another for acquiring or maintaining the possession of a child for the 
purpose of adoption. 
(b) It is an exception to the application of this section that the 
thing of value is: 
(3) a reimbursement of legal or medical expenses incurred by a 
person for the benefit of the child. 
64. Kingsley, 744 S.W.2d at 193. 
65. See Brod v. Matter of an Adoption, 522 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
(intermediary for adoptive parent may pay documented living expenses of 
natural mother); In re Carballo by Tersigni, 521 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1987) (attorney acting as intermediary, to seek an adoptive family for child, is 
not entitled to fees or reimbursements); In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., 
522 N.Y.S.2d 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (fee paid to adoption agency, licensed 
in Arizona but not in New York, is improper); In re Adoption of Alyssa, 
L.B., 501 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (adoptive parents not required 
to reimburse maternal grandmother for money given to natural mother to 
purchase an automobile); In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1986) (only 
medical payments that directly benefit child are reimbursable; counseling of 
natural mother, housing expenses, medical expenses unrelated to birth, not 
reimbursable); Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (lying-in 
expenses deemed to directly benefit child are properly reimbursable). 
66. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. 
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to contest it.67 As a result, the trial court's order compelling the 
natural mother to repay the $488.00 was vacated.68 The concurrence, 
written by Judge Eldridge and joined by Judge Rodowsky, agreed 
that the natural mother's due process rights were violated by an 
order to repay the money but disagreed with the majority's reasoning 
as to the scope of section 5-327's coverage.69 
The majority opinion begins with a summary of the appellants' 
arguments and then proceeds to answer each in turn. 70 The court 
rejected appellants' first argument, that section 5-327 does not apply 
to payments made directly to the natural parent(s) but only to 
doctors, lawyers and other third-party intermediaries.71 The court 
held that a natural parent is included in the category of one who 
"renders any service in connection with the placement of an individ-
ual for adoption . . .. "72 The court stated that it "may not be the 
warmest possible prose, but it literally does include the natural 
parents. "73 The court also rejected appellants' argument that Article 
27, section 35C, was enacted because section 5-327 does not address 
compensation made to the natural parent. 74 
The court next rejected appell.ants' contention that the word 
"compensation" in section 5-327 means profit accruing to the natural 
mother, not reimbursement for legitimate expenses. 75 Finally, in 
67. [d. at 51-52, 591 A.2d at 474 (citation omitted) ("[lJt is clear in the case before 
us that core concepts of due process would be violated by the entry of an 
order directing repayment by the natural mother when she had been given no 
notice that such an order might be entered and no opportunity to contest it. "). 
68. [d. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474. 
69. See id. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
70. See id. at 42-43, 591 A.2d at 470. Appellants' arguments can be itemized as 
follows: 1) the statute does not apply to payments made to the natural parent; 
2) the statute only governs payments made which result in profit to the recipient 
and not mere expense reimbursement; and 3) payment for maternity clothing 
qualifies as a payment for reasonable and customary charges for medical 
expenses as permitted by section 5-327(a)(2). [d. 
71. [d. at 43-44, 591 A.2d at 470-71. 
72. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(1) (1991). 
73. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 44, 591 A.2d at 471. The court based this assessment 
in part on a report concerning independent adoptions, from a committee of 
Maryland judges, that contained no suggestion that payments made to the 
natural parents would be exempted. [d. at 45, 591 A.2d at 471 (discussing 
REpORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING 
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS, COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW OF THE 
MARYLAND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 57-66 (Nov. 1, 1988». 
74. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 46-48, 591 A.2d at 472-73. Article 27, § 35C, was 
enacted to provide penalties for those engaging in bahy selling. Thus, the court 
found it inconceivable that the legislature would exclude payments made to 
natural parents from the only statute dealing with prohibited payments. [d. 
See generally infra note 93. 
75. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 48-49, 591 A.2d at 473. The court relied on the customary 
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rejecting appellants' contention that "reimbursement for maternity 
clothing falls within the statutory exemption for payment of 'reason-
able and customary charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal 
services, "'76 the court determined that "[ f] actually, and logically," 
payments for maternity clothing are not medical expenses.77 The 
court finally held that "[s]ection 5-327 provides a general prohibition 
against all payments, followed by a narrow exception for 'reasonable 
and customary charges or fees for hospital or medical or legal 
services'" that does not encompass reimbursement for maternity 
clothing.78 
The language of section 5-327 seems clear in its prohibition of 
certain types of payments and compensation to the natural mother. 
If so, it is the duty of the court to give the clear and unambiguous 
language of such a statute its natural connotation.79 Judge Eldridge's 
concurrence, however, raises some interesting questions, not only as 
to the clarity of the legislature's intent, but also as to whether the 
trial court had continuing jurisdiction after the entry of the adoption 
decree. 8o 
As held in Spencer, once the trial court has determined that it 
is in the best interests of the child to grant an adoption decree, its 
responsibility ends.81 Here, the trial judge entered the final adoption 
decree on October 25, 1989; thus, the trial court's jurisdiction ended 
on that date. The trial court's order requiring the natural mother to 
repay the $488.00, however, issued on December 14, 1989, nearly 
two months later, and at a time when it had no authority to take 
such action.82 The majority opinion does not address this discrepancy 
directly but does state that when the trial judge approved the adoption 
he expressed concern about the $488.00 and requested legal memo-
randa on the issue.83 Although the trial judge initially addressed the 
usage and various definitions of the word "compensation," which led to the 
conclusion that the word is broad enough to include, but not limited to, profit 
alone.Id. 
76. Id. at 49, 591 A.2d at 473 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(2) 
(1991». 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473. 
79. Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 1l0, 591 
A.2d 501, 503 (1991) (citing Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 582 A.2d 794 
(1990». 
80. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 52, 591 A.2d at 474 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
Judge Eldridge agreed that the circuit court's December 14, 1989 order must 
be vacated because the natural mother was not present at any of the proceedings 
and was given no notice of that order. Judge Eldridge disagreed, however, 
with the majority's interpretation of section 5-327. Id. 
81. Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 83, 195 A. 306, 310; see supra note 36. 
82. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 54-55, 591 A.2d at 476 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
83. Id. at 41, 591 A.2d at 469. 
1992] In re Adoption No. 9979 143 
$488.00 before the final adoption decree was entered, he still ap-
proved the adoption.84 One could infer from the entry of the final. 
order that the judge considered it in the best interests of the child 
to grant the adoption despite the possible violation of section 5-327. 
If that is the case, either the trial judge's jurisdiction ended with the 
entry of the final decree or he should not have signed the order until 
this issue was resolved.8s 
The concurrence also disagrees with the majority position that 
section 5-327 was intended to govern reimbursement payments made 
by the adopting parents to the natural parents.86 The concurrence 
asserts that section 5-327(a)(1) was intended to prohibit third-party 
intermediaries from attaining a profit from arranging adoptions:87 
"It stretches the bounds of credulity to interpret the phrase 'individ-
ual who renders any service in connection with the placement of an 
individual for adoption ... ' as including the natural mother who 
often, due to economic circumstances, may be forced to place her 
child with another family. "88 Although the majority opinion acknowl-
edges that such an interpretation does not constitute the "warmest 
possible prose," it concludes that the text does literally fit the facts 
of the case.89 In fact, the majority could not conceive of anyone 
rendering a greater service to the adoption process than the natural 
mother of the child.90 Even though the language of section 5-327 
does not specifically include third parties or natural parents, but only 
"individuals," among those who may not receive compensation for 
the placement of a child, one may reasonably interpret the section 
to include payments made to the natural parents. 
What is more troublesome, however, is that section 5-327 governs 
one who renders such a service and charges or receives payments 
"from or on behalf of" the natural or adoptive parents.91 This 
language is a clear indication that section 5-327 is intended to govern 
third-party actions during the adoption process. 
Maryland Senate Bill 58, later enacted as Article 27, section 
35C, also supports this argument.92 Article 27, section 35C, enacted 
to prohibit the sale of children by the natural parents, was originally 
intended as a revision to section 5-327.93 This underscores the opinion 
84. [d. 
85. See Spencer, 173 Md. at 83, 195 A. at 310. 
86. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 60, 591 A.2d at 478 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
87. [d. at 61, 591 A.2d at 479 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
88. [d. 
89. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 44, 591 A.2d at 471. 
90. [d. 
91. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(1) (1991). 
92. See S.B. No. 58, 1989 Md. Leg. Sess. 
93. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 62-63, 591 A.2d at 479-80; see infra note 74. Article 
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that section 5-327 was meant to govern third parties only; if it 
governed payments made to the natural parents then section 35C 
would appear superfluous.94 
Finally, the majority opinion relies in part upon the Report of 
the Subcommittee to Study Uniform Procedures for Handling Inde-
pendent AdoptionSlS as a part of its interpretation of section 5-327.96 
According to the majority opinion, the report strongly favors appli-
cation of the section's prohibitions to the natural and adoptive 
parents.97 Yet, section 5-327 was originally enacted in 1947 and the 
report was compiled in 1988 as an opinion of four trial judges 
concerning the application of the statute. 98 The report is not a part 
of the actual legislative history of section 5-327 such that it would 
indicate the prospective intent of the General Assembly.99 It does, 
however, represent an interpretation of the section by the Maryland 
courts. tOO 
Judge Eldridge's concurrence culminates in the following assess-
ment of the case: 
In light of the language and legislative history of § 5-327, 
this statute, containing only a criminal sanction, should not 
be construed to encompass a small reimbursement for ma-
ternity clothing from the adopting parents to the natural 
mother on the theory that the natural mother "render[ed] 
[a] service in connection with the placement of an individual 
for adoption." tOt 
In light of both the legislative history of section 5-327 and the 
enactment of Article 27, section 35C, as well, it seems that section 
5-327 was not originally intended to govern the natural parent(s). 
27, § 35C, of the Maryland Annotated Code provides as follows: 
Child sale, barter, or trade prohibited. 
(a) In general. - A person may not sell, barter, or trade, or 
offer to sell, barter, or trade a child for money or property, either 
real or personal, or anything else of value. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C (Supp. 1992). 
94. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 63, 591 A.2d at 480 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
95. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 63-64 n.6, 591 A.2d at 480 n.6 (Eldridge, J., 
concurring) (discussing the majority's misplaced reliance on the REpORT OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE TO STUDY UNIFORM PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING INDEPENDENT 
ADOPTIONS, COMMITTEE ON JUVENILE AND FAMILY LAW OF THE MARYLAND 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE (Nov. 1, 1988». 
96. See No. 9979, 323 Md. at 45, 591 A.2d·at 471. 
97.Id. 
98. Id. at 63-64 n.6, 591 A.2d at 480 n.6 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
99.Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 64-65, 591 A.2d at 481 (Eldridge, J., concurring) (alteration in No. 
9979). 
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One of the greatest obstacles to the protection of adopted 
childrens' rights in this country is the growing black market for 
babies. As noted in a recent Time Magazine article, "[a]doptive 
parents won't blink an eyelash over paying $20,000 to $30,000 for a 
healthy white baby." 102 The same article went on to say that the 
escalating price tag of this "business" often creates a license to 
steal. 103 It is against this backdrop that In re Adoption No. 9979 was 
decided. The court stated unequivocally that the prohibition of section 
5-327 is general in nature, and that the exception for medical expenses 
is a narrow one. I04 Widening that exception to include compensation 
for maternity clothing expenses will indirectly add an additional 
source of income to an already booming and sometimes illegal 
business. The court's decision will thus prevent this exception from 
becoming a loophole for the expansion of that business. 
Yet, the commentary noted above also asserts that, in many 
states, a pregnant teen quickly realizes that with a child she becomes 
eligible for Medicaid, food stamps and other welfare monies totalling 
as much as $8,000 yearly.lOs Giving the child up for adoption often 
results in "nothing but the pain of loss and the ridicule of her 
peers. "106 To interpret section 5-327 so narrowly as to prevent the 
payment of a legitimate expense that indirectly benefits the child may 
further the epidemic of teen-age mothers necessarily on welfare. 
Likewise, allowing adoptive parents to assist pregnant women with 
their expenses during pregnancy affords these women options to care 
for themselves and their unborn children. 
The court's holding in No. 9979-that section 5-327 pertains to 
reimbursement for maternity clothing expenses-represents one more 
obstacle in an already long and complicated process. In order to 
countermand this result, one recommendation is for the Maryland 
General Assembly to explicitly permit reimbursement for reasonable 
maternity clothing expenses and other reasonable expenses that in-
directly benefit the health and well-being of the unborn child. To do 
so might alleviate some of the burden on our welfare and public 
assistance system by further promoting valid adoptions that are in 
the child's best interests. 
In In re Adoption No. 9979, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has answered an important question regarding whether expenses 
incurred by a natural mother during pregnancy are reimbursable by 
adoptive parents. The court held that reimbursement by adoptive 
102. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 88. 
103. [d. 
104. No. 9979, 323 Md. at SO, 591 A.2d at 473. 
105. Gibbs, supra note 4, at 86. 
106. [d. at 86-87. 
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parents for maternity clothing expenses is prohibited by section 5-
327 of the Maryland Family Law Code. I07 Under its interpretation 
of section 5-327, the court considered the natural mother "an indi-
vidual who renders [a] service in connection with the placement of 
an individual for adoption." As such, the natural mother is generally 
prohibited from accepting compensation by section 5-327(a)(l) of the 
Maryland Family Law Code.lOs The court further held that such 
expenses are not encompassed by the language of section 5-327(a)(2), 
which provides an exception for "reasonable and customary charges 
or fees for hospital or medical or legal services. "109 
Although the result reached in this case is arguably correct, one 
wonders whether it is truly consistent with the legislative intent 
underlying Maryland's adoption law (i.e., the preservation and pro-
tection of the best interests of the adopted child). Permitting reim-
bursement to a natural mother for legitimate maternity clothing 
expenses, which arguably provides an indirect benefit to the health 
and well-being of an unborn child, seems more consistent with the 
policy objective of Maryland's adoption statutes. The Maryland 
General Assembly might wish to reconsider the scope of section 5-
327's coverage in light of the court's decision in this case and the 
policy objectives of our adoption laws. 
Donald A. Rea 
107. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 40, 591 A.2d at 469. 
108. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327(a)(I) (1991). 
109. No. 9979, 323 Md. at 50, 591 A.2d at 473. 
